| Click to |
| Subscribe Now |
| to
New Letters |
| |
|
|
|
BOOK REVIEWS |
|
Read
recent reviews of poetry and short story collections,
|
|
memoirs, and nonfiction from the pages of New Letters
magazine. |
|
(For review
guidelines click
here.) |
|
|
|
See below for
reviews of books by Brenda Miller, John D'Agata, and Clive
Fisher (about Hart Crane). |
|
|
|
From Issue 69:4 Summer 2003 |
|
The Dream of an Adequate Language, by H. L. Hix |
|
|
Reviews of: |
|
Season of the Body:
Essays, by Brenda Miller.
Sarabande, 2002.
|
The Next American
Essay, by John D’Agata.
Graywolf, 2003.
|
|
By the title of this essay (for which my apologies to
Adrienne Rich), I mean to identify the problematic through
which Brenda Miller’s Season of the Body and John
D’Agata’s The Next American Essay are united (by
common concern with language) and divided (by opposite
stances toward it). Their opposition, a standard one, can
be characterized in various ways: correspondence theory of
truth versus coherence theory; the belief that language can
tell the truth about, and set right, a life, versus the
sense that life is inaccessible and language a veil; the
essential explicability of the world versus its
inexplicability; Anglo-American analysis versus continental
synthesis; confession/ autobiography versus mysticism.
Neither book presents itself, or seems to think of
itself, in quite those terms. Miller’s essays are more
self-conscious about exploring the limits our frail, flawed
bodies impose on our quest for love; and D’Agata’s
collection explicitly aims to legitimize the essay as a
genre no less worthy of title than its favored siblings,
the novel and the poem. The two books differ in the sorts
of evidence they use to make their case. Miller uses the
facts of her own life, arranging them into a narrative from
which she derives her conclusion(s); D’Agata uses essays by
other people as his proof.
Miller insists that, despite the clarity and force of
her wish for it, she doesn’t believe in the adequacy of
language to the world. Yet the rest of her book says she
does believe, if not in the lexical adequacy of
language, an edenic ability to name, at least in the
narrative adequacy of language, the ability to tell a
true story.
Miller expresses early and often her wish that language
reveal the world. In "A Dharma Name," for example, she
gives what could count as the theme of the whole book: "All
my life, it seems, I’ve been searching for a name that
embodies me without distortion." In that essay, the wish
gets expressed literally, through depiction of a ceremony
in which Miller, converting to Buddhism, receives her
"dharma name." It also gets expressed less directly, as one
of the background premises of her conversion to Buddhism.
Miller explains that to receive their dharma names,
converts "didn’t have to take all five of the Buddhist
precepts: only the ones we honestly felt we could keep,"
adding that she herself took only two of the five vows, one
against stealing and the other "to speak the truth as
clearly as one can," i.e. to use language only to reveal
the world as it actually is.
Miller’s wish that language reveal the world receives
expression elsewhere as well. She concedes belief in "the
power of language to clarify," a power she spells out in
this way: "If we use the right words, then the world might
suddenly align itself, become knowable and good." Failures
happen, certainly: sometimes "I want to answer, but from my
mouth comes a watery language no one can understand."
Successes happen also, and when they do, "it’s a moment of
simple communication." Miller considers "simple
communication" possible.
D’Agata denies that possibility. On the very first page
of the "To the Reader" preface that introduces the book, he
writes: "I know you are expecting . . . facts from
nonfiction. But henceforth please do not consider these
‘nonfictions.’ I want you preoccupied with art in this
book, not with facts for the sake of facts. A fact," he
says, "comes from the Latin word factum—literally,
‘a thing done’—a neuter past participle construction that
suggests a fact is merely something upon which action has
happened. It’s not even a word that can do its own work.
From the same Latin root for fact we get the words
‘artifice,’ ‘counterfeit,’ ‘deficient,’ ‘façade,’ ‘infect,’
‘misfeasance,’ and ‘superficial.’ ‘There are no facts,’
Emerson once wrote, ‘only art.’ Let’s call this a
collection of essays, then—a book about human wondering."
Miller wants language to clarify, to put an end to
wondering; D’Agata thinks language gets wondering started.
In his first entry in the book, D’Agata starts by
questioning the facticity of facts; then, returning full
circle, he ends with the same question in his last entry:
. . . despite the obvious abundance of documentation in
nonfiction, some of the literature in this genre challenges
that very presumption of fact; the very character, in other
words, of what ‘nonfiction’ means. The lyric essay, as some
have called the form, asks what happens when an essay
begins to behave less like an essay and more like a poem.
What happens when statistics, reportage, and observation in
an essay are abandoned for image, emotion, expressive
transformation? In this year [2003], as we continue to wade
slowly through the start of a new century, our anxiety,
either real or imagined, needles us over the crest of the
rest of what’s left. The afterward of postmodernism waits
for us there. There are now questions being asked of facts
that were never questions before. What, we ask, is a fact
these days? What’s a lie, for that matter? What constitutes
an ‘essay,’ a ‘story,’ a ‘poem’? What, even, is
‘experience’?
He broaches the question what constitutes an essay by
presenting examples, making the late-Wittgensteinian
assumption that even if he can’t define the concept
"essay," he can use it. The essay for D’Agata is a tool.
Miller’s wish for lexical adequacy of language can’t come
true because use always precedes naming. In Wittgenstein’s
formulation, "One has already to know (or be able to do)
something in order to be capable of asking a thing's name."
In the face of the impossibility of Miller’s dream of an
identity between sense and reference, D’Agata postulates an
identity between sense and use. If Miller believes in the
redemptive power of telling the truth, D’Agata wonders
whether it’s possible to tell the truth. If Miller is
trying to discover the language of the body, D’Agata is
trying to discover the body of language.
Both books are interesting in part for the ways they
violate their own assumptions. Miller plays out her faith
in narrative’s imitation of life long enough to arrive at
the question whether life obeys the fundamental
Aristotelian narrative stricture, that it possess
beginning, middle, and end. She wishes there were such
clear progression. "Perhaps I was so intrigued by the
Jewish prayer books because in my daily life, I read
voraciously in the ‘normal’ way, front-to-back," and in
doing so "the gap between language and sense dissolved, and
I simply understood." But then she asks whether "we
ever live our lives as determinedly forward as our
narratives suggest," and suggests that "endings never stay
put, but keep changing into beginnings," leaving us
"reeling in a perpetual present." D’Agata, for his part,
despite his skepticism about facts and narratives,
organizes his collection autobiographically. He questions
the forward movement of the essay, denying that it is "an
outline traveling toward a foregone conclusion," and
reveling in its being "a wide-eyed dallying in the heat of
predicaments," but then he starts his collection with an
essay published in 1975, the year of his birth,
and—traveling in a straight line toward a foregone
conclusion—chooses one essay for every year of his own
life.
Each book has its own interest, independently of any
comparison. Miller’s is most interesting when she discusses
her discovery that she is a "DES daughter," born of a
pregnancy during which her mother took the drug DES, a drug
purported to protect against miscarriage, and prescribed,
Miller tells us, to over five-million pregnant women
between 1938 and 1971. At that point the book attains its
highest specific gravity, the greatest concentration of
emotional weight in the subject itself rather than in the
rhetoric. In the same discussion, Miller’s trust in
narrative becomes more reflective, because she is forced to
abandon one kind of narrative and adopt another. Before she
learned about DES, she was influenced by stories in the
Hebrew Bible about women whose barrenness was punishment by
God, so "I tended to see my infertility as an appropriate
consequence for a girl who broke the rules." Learning about
DES enforces a different kind of narrative, in which she
suffers not because of her own sinfulness but because of
natural forces combined with societal injustices to women.
D’Agata’s book is most interesting not for its argument
against "nonfiction" as a catch-all category into which to
dump the essay, but for the interest of the essays
themselves; or, in other words, not because of what he says
about the essays, but because he did such a good job of
choosing them. His preferences lie toward formal
experimentation, so the list of authors includes David
Antins and Carole Masos rather than John Updikes. The
essays themselves include: Jenny Boully’s footnotes without
a body of text, titled of course "The Body," which implores
the reader at one point to "recall that sometimes the world
is violet and amass with wanderers"; Harry Mathews’
detailed recipe for preparing shoulder of lamb; James
Wright’s essay, presented in prose, that is also a strict
sonnet; Eliot Weinberger’s "dream," composed of tall tales
about India, where "it was so hot men’s balls hung down to
their knees, and the men had to tie them up and apply
special ointments"; Anne Carson’s "Kinds of Water," in
which "unexpectedness moves us along"; David Foster
Wallace’s trip to the Illinois State Fair; and so on.
Both books are explicit about their motives and
convictions. Which book a reader prefers will likely be
determined by whether she agrees with Miller that "what we
want is to get at the heart: not the metaphorical heart,
not the heart that is symmetrical and good-natured and
red," or with Susan Griffin’s claim in D’Agata’s book: "The
form of the essay circumscribes imagination. At its edges
many other imagined possibilities are hovering." |
|
For
previous book reviews, click here.
|